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So That's How They Do It !
This is an actual paper I presented regarding limitations of the DSM-IV
diagnostic criteria that the psychology profession uses to diagnose us and
our children. This paper was not not meant to discredit the
profession, but rather, point out some very obvious flaws that do need
correction. The format transferred fairly well to FrontPage for the
web, but there were some crossover problems that I apologize for.
Enjoy the reading!
Is the DSM-IV an Accurate
Analysis of Mental Health?
Glenn Frisch
Augsburg
College
Is the DSM-IV an Accurate Analysis of
Mental Health?
DSM is a classification of mental health conditions.
It stands for the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders. There have been
several revisions of this statistical guide with the latest version
being termed DSM-IV TR. This
analysis paper will review past and current criteria for establishing
diagnosis sets. The historical
establishment of the DSM criteria will be investigated, as will the
rational behind childhood, adolescent, and adult diagnosis of mental
health conditions. Published
research involving the use of DSM-IV will be included.
Clinical and research data coupled with opinions regarding
shortcomings of the DSM-IV classifications will also be presented.
I will conclude this topic paper with recommendations regarding the
use of DSM-IV that I feel might be of benefit to individuals and society.
The original intent of classifying mental disorders
was to garner statistical data. This
data collection of psychological maladies in the
United States
began as far back as 1840. The
census at that time included the terms “idiocy/insanity”.
This early collection process was crude, but effective in its
solitary goal. With time, it
was recognized that patients in a psychiatric hospital needed a more
complete diagnosis than just “insane”.
By 1880 there were 7 categories of mental impairment established
(DSM-IV-TR, 2000). The
categories included mania, monomania, paresis, melancholia, dementia,
dipsomania and epilepsy. We
now know that epilepsy is classified as a physical disorder, unless
discussing co-joining factors that result directly from suffering with
epilepsy (depression, alienation, etc.).
An accurate diagnosis associated with a mental condition was
difficult to obtain within the criteria established.
This allowed for less than stellar diagnostic patterns that had no
cohesiveness and were deemed secretive, if not totally strange by the
general public.
The DSM-I was originally created in the 1952 as a
guide or directive for treating patients in the area of mental health.
Up until that time, much of the structure of care and ultimate
treatment outcomes was directly dependant on the doctor’s, individual
analysis and recommendations. The
DSM-I and its successor DSM-II had drawbacks, however, as the guidelines
were restrictive. The DSM-I
had only 3 categories (psychological, social, and biological) and
attempted to establish clinical diagnoses and care within those
parameters. The DSM-I guide
first introduced the term reaction when describing psychological
processes and impairments. The
DSM II was nearly identical to the DSM-I with the exception of the removal
of the term reaction. This
early change showed the continual evolution to which psychological
terminology and criteria are subjected.
The DSM guides have typically been aligned as closely
as possible with the International Classification of Diseases (ICD).
This international classification allows for coding of disorders,
but does not give criteria for establishing a diagnosis or care
directives. This has placed
the American Psychological Association (APA) and the World Health
Organization (WHO) at odds with each other over the years.
With the establishment of the DSM-III in 1980 the division between
ICD and DSM grew even larger. The
DSM-III included 16 categories of mental disorders as recommended by
Washington
University
investigators. The psychosis
category of the DSM-II was divided into psychotic disorders and affective
disorders. The category of
neurosis was also divided into 4 separate categories (anxiety, somatoform,
dissociative and affective), which would impart a more accurate diagnosis
to the patient. The DSM-III
was designed for clinical effectiveness and the ICD-9 coding had to be
modified according to the American standards.
The DSM-III stimulated research as a result of the distinct
disorder categorization and the collection of data within those
categories. The increase in
research reinforced credibility of the psychology profession.
Another positive affect of the DSM-III classifications was that it
established the psychological field as a scientifically based form of
health care. Conditions could
be documented, tracked and even predicted due to prior data collections
within specific categories. Gone
were the days of the generic diagnosis that seemed to be cloaked in
secrecy. With the DSM-III came
a clinical definition of disorders, criteria required to fit the
disorders, and care recommendations based on statistical data as well as
the empirically acquired data. The
categories of the DSM-III were:
1.
Disorders
usually first diagnosed in infancy,
childhood or adolescence
2.
Delirium,
dementia and amnestic and other
cognitive disorders
3.
Mental
disorders due to a general medical
condition
4.
Substance-related
disorders
5.
Schizophrenia
and other psychotic disorders
6.
Mood
disorders
7.
Anxiety
disorders
8.
Somatoform
disorders
9.
Factitious
disorders
10.
Dissociative disorders
11.
Sexual and gender identity disorders
12.
Eating disorders
13.
Sleep disorders
14.
Impulse-control disorders not elsewhere
classified
15.
Adjustment disorders
16.
Personality disorders
The implementation of the DSM-IV (1994) and the
DSM-IV-TR (2000) allowed for expansion of the criteria set forth in the
DSM-III. Most notable was the
use of simplified sets of criteria used to make a diagnosis, a historical
use of empirical data and a reliance on existing research.
These three categories give the DSM-IV greater flexibility in
making a clinical diagnosis (Hamstra, 1994).
But, it is this flexibility of the criteria that also allows for
discrepancies and false positives/negatives when determining an
appropriate diagnosis. There
is a frequent overlapping of conditional criteria and this may result in
an inaccurate or inappropriate diagnosis being administered.
A diagnosis is a categorization of a set of symptoms
or findings. There are
problems that can arise when a definition (diagnosis) of a set of symptoms
is implemented. This can
include labeling of the patient according to a diagnostic title given by a
therapist. Patients who are
given a ‘title’ of a diagnosis may begin to hold that diagnosis
responsible for their actions and behavior, while neglecting their own
personal responsibility in resolving the condition.
Diagnosis classifications can and often do coincide with societal
fads, but fads evolve. Diagnoses
attributed to ‘toxic shock syndrome’ and ‘silicon breast
implantation’ of the 1970’s have been largely unsupported with time.
What may not evolve with time are cultural variations
of expectations, interpretations and cultural acceptances in a society.
What may be perfectly normal behavior in one culture may seem
bizarre or even immoral in another. A
condition of hyperactivity in an American culture may be perfectly normal
in an African culture. Diagnostic
criteria must be malleable enough to incorporate personal and social
variations to insure accuracy. A
more in depth look at inconsistencies of the DSM-IV and DSM-IV-TR will be
discussed later in this paper.
Diagnostic Criteria are necessary to first, establish
that something is wrong and second, to categorize the symptoms or
objective findings into a classification that can be used for remission of
the condition. But, at what
age are diagnostic criteria relevant?
At what age is it appropriate to begin determinations of function
versus dysfunction according to social norms?
There is quite an extensive body of work addressing childhood
mental conditions. This
includes, but is not limited to ADD, ADHD, and conduct disorders.
The literature tells us that children have disorders that require
attention and stabilization, but is the analysis correct and are the
criteria sets accurate?
The DSM-IV-TR states that the diagnosis of Attention-
Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder may be used when certain criteria are met.
The criteria are as follows:
Symptoms of hyperactivity-impulsivity
persisting for at least six months to a degree that is maladaptive and
inconsistent with developmental level.
Six or more must apply.
1.
often fidgets with hands or feet or squirms in seat
2.
often leaves seat in classroom or in other situations in
which remaining seated is expected
3.
often runs about or climbs excessively in situations in
which it is inappropriate (in adolescents or adults, may be limited to
subjective feelings of restlessness)
4.
often has difficulty playing or engaging in leisure
activities quietly
5.
is often “on the go” or often acts as if “driven by a
motor”
6.
often talks excessively
7.
often blurts out answers before questions have been
completed
8.
often has difficulty awaiting a turn
9.
often interrupts or intrudes on others (e.g., butts into
conversations or games)
There is also a section of 9 statements regarding inattention to
co-join the hyperactivity-impulsivity category.
Those statements are similar subjective classifications as the
hyperactivity-impulsivity category so I will not list each separately.
The diagnosis of Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder is
classified into three categories:
·
314.01 Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder, Combined
type.
·
314.00 Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder,
Predominantly Inattentive Type.
·
314.01 Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder,
Predominantly Hyperactive-Impulsive Type.
·
Adolescents not meeting full criteria may be classified as
“In Partial Remission”
My
first comment after reading these definitions of ADHD is “Define often”.
These classifications are too subjective to be considered
objectively scientific. What
child sits quietly, doesn’t talk excessively, plays quietly or isn’t
“on the go”? These
statements practically describe a normal child.
I am sure that there are instances of unruly, destructive or
abusive children, but nowhere does the DSM-IV-TR state that “the child
is rude”, “the child is verbally abusive during play” or “the
child intentionally runs in front of cars during play”.
These are conditions that would raise concern to me, not if the
child talks out of turn.
It would appear that most of the classifications
listed could be improved or corrected through guidance, discipline and
adult examples of proper behavior. I
do not feel that the classifications of ADHD are concretely indicative of
a disorder. There is too much
room for error in diagnostic criteria when diagnosing ADHD.
I am not sure if the criteria are actually objectively diagnostic
at all. There is therapist
bias; parent demands that something be done and school/teacher influence
that may all drive a diagnosis that is improper.
The answer to this problem seems to be medication with Ritalin and
behavioral counseling. But, is
this the best treatment? I
have my doubts. The criteria
appear to be grossly inadequate for a definitive, objective diagnosis that
a condition exists at all. If
these classifications of mental disorders are so important to our
defenseless young, why are we being so inept in determining if a condition
exists at all?
This lack of a ‘gold standard’ in diagnosing ADHD
was discussed in a recent study of DSM-IV reliability between researchers
and ‘real world’ clinicians (Lewczyk, 2003).
It was reported that researchers had a higher inter-examiner
reliability (46.7%) than did clinicians (23.3%) in diagnosing ADHD.
The discrepancies between the two groups were attributed to methods
of interviewing and a general lack of understanding of how treating
clinicians make diagnostic decisions.
It was implied that if the clinicians would follow research
interview guidelines they might achieve similar results.
They did not discuss the possibility that the ‘real world’
clinicians were actually interacting with the subjects, had a closer
interaction with patients concerns, and were able to evaluate the patient
more accurately without crossover diagnoses that would give false positive
findings. I am curious as to
whether the clinicians were expected to ignore clinically objective data
and follow predetermined guidelines? With
the subjectivity found in the DSM-IV diagnostic criteria it would seem to
me that any degree of true clinical objectivity would be of benefit to the
patient. An item of concern in
this study was that the research group agreed on a diagnosis of ADHD less
than 50% of the time.
ADHD does appear across cultures as well, but only
when the same research based interview and diagnostic criteria are used.
Latin American children appear to be more active and talk more when
distressed than do American children (Rohde, 2002).
This cross-cultural difference shows that there may be no ‘gold
standard’ available to truly diagnose ADHD within and between groups of
children. If this is the case,
the criteria need to be modified to acknowledge these differences.
ADHD is a widely given diagnosis that, at least in the
United States
, seems to be a babysitting tool for educators and parents alike.
If the diagnostic criteria are not objective enough to solidify a
dysfunctional disorder on a consistent basis then we may be looking at a
diagnostic trend, rather than a pathological entity.
Additional classifications of childhood mental
conditions showed disagreements in reliability as well.
A review of the literature for childhood anxiety disorders revealed
discrepancies of validity criteria. A
study of Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV: Child and Parent
Versions (Silverman, 2001) involved testing 62 children (7-16 years) and
their parents to evaluate the reliability between groups for generalized
anxiety disorder as well as other mental conditions.
The reliability between parent and child for generalized anxiety
disorder was determined to be excellent.
The DSM-IV criteria were used and the same researcher performed
both the test and the retest. It
was implied that the structure of the interview process was key to the
favorable statistical outcome.
The diagnosis of childhood anxiety, however, suffers
from the same subjective limitations as ADHD.
The simple variance of adding an additional researcher for the
second test (Muniya, 2003) appears to confound the results of the
Silverman study. When
different interviewers administered the child and parent testing to 45
children and their parents the reliability between the groups was poor.
Their explanation for the results included the possibility that a
sole researcher, over time, may be better able to determine a relationship
between symptoms and a diagnostic disorder.
This would seem to add credence to the insight of the clinician in
forming a workable diagnosis, rather than operating within criteria sets
that may be weak or possibly invalid.
It would appear that there are acknowledged
limitations to the ability of the DSM-IV to accurately diagnosis a mental
disorder in children. I feel
that the DSM-IV may be a necessary evolutionary step in the diagnosis of
childhood mental disorders, but that the criteria for impairment allow for
large inaccuracies. This would
apply directly to the popular diagnoses of childhood ADHD and general
anxiety disorders. The
qualifying criteria statements may be manipulated for convenience or
monetary gain by the therapist. The
DSM-IV also contains a new ‘safety net’ in administering a diagnosis
that should be of concern to doctors, therapists and patients.
It reads: The symptoms cause clinically significant distress or
impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of
functioning. Including
this sentence is like throwing a blanket around a weak or vague set of
symptoms to give them credibility and validity under any category.
The doctor or therapist should be keenly aware that giving a
diagnosis based on weak criteria in childhood might have repercussions for
that child during adolescence and beyond.
Adolescent children are at a developmental stage in
their lives both physically and emotionally.
This stage of rapid physical growth and mental development is due,
at least in part, to the increase in hormone levels in the body.
These hormones stimulate physical growth, influence emotions of
irritability and anger, mood swings, periods of confusion about ‘who
they are’, and sexual reproductive urges.
The adolescent individual is no longer a child.
Too many physical changes and mental gains have occurred to
classify the teen as a child. They
are on their way to becoming a mature adult, but the transition is
difficult. I am somewhat
concerned that a diagnosis given in childhood may be inappropriately
applied to a teenager. A teenager is a completely different individual
than the child who was given the original diagnosis.
The psychology field does not seem to favor the idea that a
diagnosis may completely resolve. In
the DSM-IV-TR, there is a footnote, which states that an adolescent may be
given a diagnosis of In Partial Remission. This
diagnosis may be applied even if the child does not present with
the same criteria for which the original diagnosis was given.
It seems that once a child is given a diagnosis it may be
considered a permanent tag. It
seems fairly obvious that an improper diagnosis may easily follow a child
into adolescence and beyond. This
is not fair to the child or teenager.
At what point is a diagnosis considered resolved?
It has been proposed that ADHD may actually be a
learning disorder (Boschert, 2001). The
crossover (overlap) of diagnosis criteria may have allowed ADHD to take
center stage at the expense of a more accurate or insightful diagnosis of
a learning disorder. Boschert
sites the growing evidence that ADHD results from a failure to inhibit or
delay behavioral responses. Rather
than suffering with a pathological entity, teenagers with a diagnosis of
ADHD appear to be more impaired in processing speed and color naming than
other teenagers. This would
imply that a learning process has been improperly established or
interrupted. Steps should be
taken to begin evaluating at what stages of processing this occurs.
If ADHD is truly a learning disorder, rather than a medical entity,
medication will not correct the problem.
It may actually contribute to a worsening of the condition by
interrupting normal neurotransmitter transmission.
Up to two thirds of children and adolescents given a
diagnosis of ADHD will carry that diagnosis into adulthood (Leuzzi &
Spandorfer, 2000). The new
DSM-IV criteria insure this possibility by new language in the text.
An adult diagnosis of ADHD must include a history of ADHD as a
child or teen. The new
language allows for a regressive diagnosis of adult ADHD because they may
not have known they were suffering with the disorder.
This language is awkward and allows the doctor or therapist to give
a post-dated diagnosis because of a set of current symptoms.
This seems wrong. The
risk is too high for fraudulent diagnoses for the sole purpose of
financial gain from a third party payor (insurance company).
It may also give improper validation for a lifetime of error or
intentional wrongdoing. How
many convicted criminals would endorse the opportunity to say that the
reason they committed a lifetime of crimes was due to an undiagnosed
disorder called ADHD? The
legal profession has probably already attempted this defense.
I don’t feel that we should encourage that validation without
stronger objective data.
One of the more interesting studies regarding the
progression of ADHD from childhood to adulthood was a 14-year longitudinal
Dutch study (Hofstra, 2002). In
1983, parent- ratings were gathered for 1578 children and adolescents
ranging in age from 4-16. The
subjects were garnered from the general Dutch population and were
determined to have behavioral and/or emotional problems at that time.
The children were not allowed to give self-ratings.
The 14-year follow-up of these children and teenagers determined
that children who suffered from parent-reported behavioral and emotional
problems were more likely to suffer from similar or related problems in
adulthood. This included
depression, adult ADHD as well as other behavioral problems and
psychopathology.
I feel that this study has some problems associated
with its structure and analysis. First,
the original data was collected from parents and did not have child or
adolescent interviews. Secondly,
the data was subjected to criteria available in 1983 and not current day
criteria. I feel that the
follow-up collection of data in 1997 was confounded in its collection
process. The parents were not
interviewed. Instead, the
former children and teenagers performed the rating scale.
This seems very subjective in its relevance.
By not allowing the children to be interviewed in the first study,
but relying on their reporting in the second study would seem to be
comparing apples and oranges. The
data is different. Additionally,
the new data obtained was subjected to the DSM-IV criteria and compared to
the 1983 data as though they were equal in balance and strength of
content. This comparison may
not seem to carry too much weight in itself until that comparative data is
allowed to make a prediction. That
is precisely what happened in this study.
As a result of the parent-reported problems in 1983
and the 14-year follow-up of child and adolescent reports, predictions for
adult behavior were made. The
Dutch researchers concluded that according to the DSM-IV criteria, their
‘prospective examination’ revealed that high levels of childhood
behavioral problems (primarily rule breaking) were directly related to
adult disruptive disorders. The
DSM-IV would appear to have met the needs for continued care for mental
and behavioral disorders, even when the subject pools were different for
data collection. The topic of
labeling as a child being somewhat responsible for adult self-reporting of
problems was not discussed. I
feel that this study was negligent in its data collection methods and the
subject pool used. The
flexibility of the DSM-IV discussed earlier in this paper appears to allow
for this type of data collection to appear to be relevant, when in fact it
should be scrutinized very closely. There
may actually be some relevant data in this longitudinal study, but I feel
that they reached too far with their claims.
With the data presented, it would be fairly easy to
understand how adult diagnoses of mental conditions ‘rollover’ from
childhood or adolescence. The
DSM-IV has given the mental health field a liberal wand with which to
establish expansive, ongoing diagnoses and treatment parameters for nearly
everyone who seeks help or guidance from a counselor, therapist or
psychologist/psychiatrist. This
establishes and encourages ongoing, lifetime care and the dependency it
may create.
Diagnosing adult conditions like ADHD is different
than that of children and adolescents.
Diagnosing adult ADHD can be difficult because there are rarely
distinct characteristics available to fit the criteria required for a
diagnosis (MacReady, 2003). Because
of this, empirical data is often called upon to aid in part of the
decision-making process. MacReady
states that up to forty percent of adults develop ADHD later than
childhood, even though the DSM-IV states that a childhood diagnosis of
ADHD was needed for the adult diagnosis (unless the new criterion are
used). She says that it is
more appropriate to look at an individual’s past for possible
indicators, but take that knowledge “with a grain of salt”.
MacReady’s opinions on adult ADHD were refreshing
in that she stressed that a clinician or researcher should rely more on
the data at hand, incorporated with continued observation and discussion
to implement a proper diagnosis. I
believe she understands the shortcomings of the DSM-IV criteria and the
inaccuracies that may occur when trying to establish a diagnosis.
MacReady is not alone in her critique of the limitations of the
current fourth edition of the DSM. Researchers
and clinicians alike are becoming more vocal in their assessment of
limitations regarding the DSM-IV criteria.
A significant, new variation in the DSM-IV criteria
is that nearly fifty percent of all diagnoses include a new ‘clinical
criterion’. This new
criteria was introduced with the intent of making the clinician’s job of
diagnosis easier and more accurate than before.
The problem with the new criterion language is that is so vague and
expansive that nearly every symptom could qualify for a diagnosis even if
it is merely a ‘normal’, but stressful period in one’s life that
will pass (Spitzer, 1999). The
language states that nearly fifty percent of all symptoms qualify for a
diagnosis on Axis III if the symptomatology causes “clinically
significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other
important areas of functioning”.
The language is too vague and expansive.
If a person is temporarily depressed because of the death of
someone close they could qualify for a diagnosis of a mental disorder,
rather than acknowledging that it is simply a period of bereavement.
We are supposed to be sad at times like that.
You likely have a problem if you are not unhappy when someone near
you dies.
Spitzer notes further that the clinical significance
criterion was not based on research, clinical data or empirical evidence.
The language was established on ‘conceptual grounds’.
The task force who assembled the DSM-IV text felt that it might
help eliminate some of the false positive diagnoses.
A false positive is when a condition is diagnosed, but does not
actually exist based on criteria. The
new language actually insures that nearly all diagnoses can be supported.
This might not be legal fraud, but I question if it qualifies as
moral fraud on behalf of every patient given a psychiatric diagnosis.
A study evaluating the differences between clinical
and research practices in establishing borderline personality disorders
(Zimmerman, 1999) concluded that clinicians usually only gave one
significant diagnosis. Researchers
following a more rigid interview commonly gave multiple diagnoses.
It was proposed that if clinicians followed a more structured DSM
approach to diagnosis the reliability rate of diagnoses would improve
because clinicians would implement more diagnoses.
The new DSM-IV clinical significance criterion allows for improved
correlation between clinician and researcher, but did they forget about
the patient? Establishing a
set of criteria to make sure that everyone agrees seems more important
than being accurate. I think
that the task force in charge of establishing DSM guidelines should take a
better look at why doctors and therapist became doctors and therapists.
It wasn’t to please a set of criteria.
It was to help people in need resolve an issue.
Intent doesn’t remedy conditions.
Within my limited confines I have tried to expose
some of the seemingly obvious inaccuracies regarding diagnosis
implementation according to DSM-IV criteria.
The DSM is described as a set of guidelines, rather than hard-fast
recommendations for diagnosis and care.
This may sound favorable to a reader, but in reality it doesn’t
hold true. Without a diagnosis
according to the DSM-IV guides the hospital, clinician or researcher will
not get paid by an insurance company and will likely have a governing
board investigating their competency to evaluate and treat patients.
The dilemma of the DSM-IV criteria has reached
circles of medical influence. Mental
health professionals are beginning to question the validity of the
language expansion of the DSM-IV. Most
mental disorders are accepted as etiological in origin and without
external, objective, validating factors (Cain, 2003).
Social and environmentally caused disorders are more difficult to
define than biophysical mental disorders like Alzheimer’s disease, Down’s
syndrome or even progressive Dementias. Physical, diagnostic testing using
x-ray, MRI, CT and Laboratory results in reproducible, objective data that
can diagnose a condition without doctor misrepresentation. The reliability
of testing imparts validity. The
social and environmental diagnoses of ADHD, anxiety, and personality
disorders need more advanced testing methods than are currently employed.
Although psychology deems itself a science, there appears to be an
imposed separation between the psychology field and the basic sciences.
This is unfortunate and should be remedied.
I feel that one would support and reinforce the other.
The National Institute of Mental Health agrees with
this approach and stressed the need for cooperation between the basic
sciences and the mental health field, particularly developmental
neurobiology and behavioral sciences (Hoagwood, 2002).
The NIMH acknowledges the limitations of solid diagnostic criteria
within the mental health profession and recommends including biological
parameters for future study and analysis.
An example would be the scenario of smoking causing disease.
Smoking has been determined to be a contributing factor to lung
cancer. This causation has
been determined using an etiological approach that includes behavioral and
biological components. By
testing ADHD, PTSD, and other personality disorders in a similar fashion
we might be able to give more definitive criteria to the ‘who and why’
behind mental illness.
The DSM-IV criteria are actually confining to the
mental health profession. As
the DSM becomes more expansive in language criterion it loses the concept
of distinct, measurable entities that are so important to condition
resolution. Substance abuse
under the new DSM-IV-TR guidelines can be defined as your girlfriend
yelling at you about your chemical use and resulting behavior.
But, if the two of your sit down, talk, and come to an agreement
about future use and behavior, it is no longer classified as a mental
disorder (
Wakefield
, 2003). I wonder how the
DSM-IV-TR would classify the young man if his girlfriend sat down, had a
drink, and smoked a joint with him? Would
it still be classified as a disruptive mental disorder?
The DSM-IV has provided the mental health field with
a set of criteria to establish a diagnosis and begin care to stabilize or
resolve mental disorders. The
criteria, however limiting, perform a function that did not exist prior to
the implementation of the DSM-I in 1952.
Establishing distinct criteria by using empirical, clinical, and
research data has allowed the psychological field to be considered a hard
science. I feel that the
implementation of the DSM-IV and DSM-IV-TR places this scientific position
at risk. The categorization of
disorders from childhood through adolescence and into adulthood often
appears to be rollover diagnoses with minimal attempts at a resolution of
the condition. Even if a
condition could be considered resolved by one set of criteria, new
criteria allow that same condition to be re-instituted by placing it “in
partial remission”. People
classified as mentally impaired seem to be trapped from cradle to grave in
the mental health field with little chance for the separation of
themselves from a tag-along diagnosis.
The diagnosis is not just a designation of a mental state at any
one period of time; it labels the individual.
They must learn to live, work and carry on relationships knowing
that they have been labeled as a ‘certain type of person’, rather than
an individual with a condition that is progressing toward a resolution.
The confines of the current diagnostic criteria allow for a varied
array of symptoms to be placed in one or more categories.
The flexible language that a counselor or therapist can use ‘locks
in’ the diagnosis. Once a
diagnosis is established, insurance carriers, other doctors, counselors
and therapists may have access to this information.
This strengthens the label established by the diagnosis.
When an employer or a state agency finds out about a diagnosis they
may restrict hiring practices or benefit packages.
A normal, stressful, temporary mental state can easily blossom into
an 800 lb. gorilla that never goes away.
Instead of helping a patient, the doctor, therapist or counselor
might actually be doing harm by implementing a diagnosis.
But, without a diagnosis, the mental health field loses its ‘scientific’
credibility. This is a
double-edged sword that has the sharpest side pointing at the patient.
Having acknowledged the faults of the DSM-IV
criteria, I am not sure that I have concrete ideas for fixing the problem.
I feel, however, that criticism without answers is nothing more
than a bully pulpit so I will impart a few simple ideas that may have
merit.
The DSM-IV and DSM-IV-TR criteria need to be modified
and clarified, not disassembled. The
new language that has been implemented in the last two versions of the DSM
needs to be either removed completely or restricted to specific
conditions. To say that an
adult with no symptomatology from a childhood diagnosis of ADHD is merely
“in partial remission” strikes of a never-ending diagnosis that is
always reimbursable. This
behavior is likely monetarily driven and not results driven.
Serious re-evaluation is needed.
Re-evaluation is also needed in establishing the significance of a
condition. A mild case of
anxiety may be just that. The
expansive language of the DSM-IV allows for this condition to be
classified as a mental disorder if the clinician or researcher determines
that there is “clinically significant distress or impairment in social,
occupational, or other important areas of functioning”.
The diagnosis is not being instituted on the data alone, but also
by interpretation. This leaves
much room for deceit, dishonesty, and actually creates the ‘false-positives’
associated with mental health diagnosis.
For the mental health field to solidify their
position in the hard sciences they need to become more objective in their
assessments. In my clinic,
objectivity is necessary to differentiate if a male patient has simple,
acute low back pain or a metastatic bone cancer referred from the
prostate. Testing includes a
personal and family history as well as a symptom interview.
Following this there is a physical examination to ‘rule out’
diagnostic possibilities. If
the diagnosis is not firmly established by the examination, x-rays, MRI,
CT, and laboratory work-ups might be implemented.
Second opinions and specialist consults are commonly used.
Diagnostic screening continues until the diagnosis is solidly
confirmed. The patient’s
life depends on this objective analysis.
They are consulted and kept informed of their status throughout the
complete process. They know
that they are a key component to their own recovery, but they also know
that there either is or is not the possibility of recovery.
I feel that the mental health field needs to
incorporate this type of basic science objectivity into their diagnostic
criteria. By investigating the
physical components associated with even temporary mental states the
psychology field can solidify their position by first, acknowledging that
a condition exists and secondly, determining when it is resolved.
The use of MRI, CT and PET scanning has already proved fruitful in
the early diagnoses of schizophrenia due to ventricle size.
It is this use of advanced screening tools that will drive
diagnoses in the direction of accuracy.
The demystification of psychology would be financially lucrative to
practitioners, researchers, and educational facilities as well.
More people will use mental health services when the diagnosis
given is seen as really theirs, rather than what a doctor or therapist
gives to them. These simple
steps toward irrefutable objectivity might also increase the number of
active mental health practitioners, rather than the trend to use
psychology as a springboard into another career.
There is a difficult situation that occurs when
objectivity is standardized; the personal flare of the doctor or therapist
is minimized and the intent of care is maximized.
The doctor cannot rely on personality or hide behind difficult to
understand DSM descriptions. When
objective diagnostic criteria are used to determine that a condition
exists, the patient wants to know when they are objectively better as
well. This attitude demands
accountability from the doctor or therapist administering care.
The stress placed on the doctor can be minimized by referring to
the objective diagnostic data as a predictor of outcomes.
It will actually make the doctor or therapist’s job much easier
and less stressful than it likely is now.
A final recommendation that I would have for the
mental health profession would be to begin demanding more from patients.
Our society seems to allow everyone to blame their lack of success
in one or more areas of life by being a victim.
“Its not my fault”, “I never had a chance”, and “If they
hadn’t done that to me…” are just a couple of the many excuses
people use justify their situation. When
the doctor becomes a willing accomplice in patient’s situation it does
not benefit the patient’s recovery and likely prolongs it.
This may seem like a crass attitude, but it is not.
It is actually an attitude of extreme caring.
When a diagnosis is made based on objective criteria, a behavioral
or social disorder will be acknowledged by available data.
The patient that realizes they may not have anything organically
wrong with them is likely to take more responsibility for their recovery
than the patient who is able to hide behind titles of bipolar and ADHD
found in a 4-inch thick manual of disease states. Making the diagnosis of
mental disorders should not get easier, but rather, more difficult and
exact.
There has been a social world impact made by fifty
years of using DSM criteria. Many
thousands have benefited by consulting with a mental health professional,
but I would venture a guess that many have also not benefited from care.
Is this the fault of the therapist?
Possibly. I would be
more inclined to fault the criteria that the therapist was forced to
follow. When the mental health
field catches up to traditional medicine in its approach to diagnosis, the
influx of people into doctor’s and therapists offices will be
staggering. Who wouldn’t go
to see Mary Smith, PhD for an anxiety issue when objective findings could
be obtained and a resolution accurately structured.
It would be much like consulting a financial planner; you have
questions and they have answers.
The world is becoming smaller as technology and trade
increases. The cultural
differences of foreign countries are beginning to influence our cities and
nation. The DSM criterion
needs to also reflect these differences to accurately care for a changing
population. Objectivity can
accomplish this. To continue
to rewrite and add catchall phrases to the existing DSM criteria will lead
to an implosion of mental health credibility.
The doctor, therapist or counselor who can provide a necessary,
predictable, results driven service to the public will survive and thrive
regardless of insurance coverage or state restrictions for payment of
services. The evolution of the
mental health profession is inevitable.
The current trend toward all-inclusive diagnostic coding is not
supported by objective, predictable data and will need to be modified.
That direction of modification will follow one of two paths.
The first path follows the current trend of independent, DSM
criteria directing the doctor or therapist’s diagnosis.
The second path allows predictable biological and physical tests to
be incorporated into the patient’s symptomatic picture.
The objectivity of the testing frees the therapist’s
decision-making ability as to causation of the disorder and allows them to
focus on correction of the disorder according to the objective data.
Psychology does not need to ‘throw the baby out with the bath
water’, but the profession should take a hard look at the validity of
the current direction of the DSM criteria.
The mental health profession needs to take steps now to solidify
their position of necessity for the next fifty years.
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